时间：2016年11月28日 下午16:40-17:30

地点：邵逸夫科学馆513

题目: Private Provision of Public Goods: Uniform Price Mechanisms with a Threshold

主讲人：厦门大学 李智助理教授 （经济学院财政系、WISE）

摘要: We introduce two novel mechanisms for provision point public goods: The uniform price auction mechanism (UPA) collects an endogenously determined uniform price from everyone offering at least that price, while the uniform price cap mechanism (UPC) collects the uniform price from everyone offering at least that price, plus the full offer of everyone offering less.  With complete information, UPC has the same undominated perfect equilibria as standard provision point (PPM) and proportional rebate (PR) mechanisms—and UPA a somewhat broader set—but our mechanisms’ wide-range-of-zero-marginal penalty structures may facilitate equilibrium selection and lead to higher contributions and more frequent provision.  With private value information, the uniform price mechanisms support Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) with higher contributions than the BNE of PPM or PR, potentially increasing efficiency.  Our mechanisms outperform PR and PPM in both information environments in laboratory experiments: in general, UPC generates higher aggregate contributions and provision rates than PR and PPM; UPA attracts much higher contributions, although it provides less frequently.  The ranking emerges because high offers are more common (especially among high-value people) in the uniform price mechanisms, where it is low cost to venture high offers to potentially meet other high offers to support provision. 

主讲人介绍：李智于2015年获美国华盛顿大学（西雅图）经济学博士，后加盟厦门大学经济学科，任经济学院财政系、WISE双聘助理教授，主要研究领域为博弈论、实验经济学、资源和环境经济学等。李智作为第一作者与美国华盛顿大学（西雅图）副教授Christopher M. Anderson、美国康涅狄格大学教授Stephen K. Swallow合作的学术论文“Uniform Price Mechanisms for Threshold Public Goods Provision with Complete Information: An Experimental Investigation”，在线发表于Journal of Public Economics上。该文引入两种新的“均一”价格机制（uniform price mechanisms）提供阈值公共物品（threshold public goods）。通过博弈理论和经济学实验，作者发现这两种“均一”价格机制比目前文献中流行的机制——provision point mechanism 和 proportional rebate Mechanism能够更好的促进公共物品的私人提供，并更准确的对公共物品进行价值评估。